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Unilateralrefusals to deal
and the Antitrust Modernization
Commission Report
BY KEITH

I.

N. HYLTON*

INTRODUCTION

On the subject of unilateral refusals to deal, the Antitrust Modernization Commission (the Commission) recommends that "refusals to
deal with rivals in the same market should rarely, if ever, be unlawful
under antitrust law, even for a monopolist."' The Commission concluded its report by endorsing
the longstanding principle that, in general, firms have no duty to deal
with a rival in the same market. To the extent that circumstances exist in
which firms may be liable for a refusal to deal with a rival in the same
market, the courts should further clarify those circumstances.2
The purpose of this article is to take up the Commission's request
for further clarification. Clarification could take one of two
approaches. One is to set out rules, like the rules of a game, that a
dominant firm would have to follow in order to avoid liability for
*

Keith N. Hylton, School of Law, Boston University.
ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM'N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

101 (2007), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report
-recommendation /amc-final-report.pdf.
2
Id. at 104.
© 2008 by FederalLegal Publications,Inc.
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refusing to deal.3 The other approach would attempt to state a set of
principles governing liability, leaving it to the courts to define the
rules of the game through case law adjudication.
I will adopt the second approach here; that is, I will try to set out
principles governing liability rather than rules governing conduct. I
take this approach for the following reasons. First, I doubt that it is
possible in this area of the law to set out a body of clear rules that
would channel a dominant firm's conduct in a manner that would
enable it to avoid liability with certainty. For example, if one states as
a rule that a dominant firm should be immune from liability if it
exploits its market position but not if it excludes a rival,' that merely
forces a court to distinguish cases of exploitation from exclusion. The
clarity provided by such a rule is temporary and largely illusory. Second, the biggest problem in the refusal to deal context is trying to set
out principles, not rules guiding conduct.
The Commission report does not use the term "essential facility"
in its discussion of refusals to deal, but I will use it at times below.
Although the term has been the subject of criticism5 and the Supreme
Court has never recognized the essential facility doctrine as an independent theory of antitrust liability,6 the concept remains useful in
the area of refusals to deal. The cases involve firms that have market
power, and often the source of that power is some property or entity
that the defendant controls that provides it an enormous advantage
in the market. The term essential facility makes it easier to describe
the property that is at the core of the case.
I will argue here that a legal test that is strongly biased in favor of
defendants, as the Commission recommends, is desirable as a default
rule and especially so in cases in which the essential facility at the
core of the refusal to deal dispute is efficiency enhancing. However,
there is another set of cases in which the defendant gains control of
an essential market portal. In these cases, a legal test that is less
See id. at 104 & 115 nn.187-89.
Id. at 104.
5 Phillip Areeda, Essential Facilities:An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles, 58 ANTITRUST L. J. 841 (1990).
6
Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 411 (2004).
3
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biased in favor of defendants may be preferable to the Commission's
suggested approach.
THE LAW OF MONOPOLIZATION AND
REFUSALS TO DEAL

II.

The Commission report describes the law on refusals to deal by
relying on Verizon Communications Inc. v. Trinko/ where the Court held
that the defendant did not have a duty to deal with rivals. The Commission report notes that Trinko offered two reasons to distinguish the
facts in that case from those of Aspen Skiing v. Aspen Highlands,8 in
which the Court required the defendant to deal with a rival. One was
that the defendant in Aspen Skiing had exited a mutually beneficial
joint marketing arrangement, while the defendant in Trinko did not
have the previous experience of being in a joint venture with the
plaintiff.' The other was that the defendant in Aspen Skiing had
rejected an option to sell its service at retail price to the defendant,
while the defendant in Trinko had not been presented with such an
option.'" As the Commission report notes, the Court did not spell out
precisely what these distinctions would mean in future cases." For
example, it is not clear after Trinko whether a decision to exit a mutually beneficial joint venture would imply a violation of section 2 on
the part of the dominant firm.
A. General standards
Looking generally at the case law on monopolization, two broad
legal standards appear to have been adopted.'2 One is the welfare bal7

'

Id.
Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985).

Trinko, 540 U.S. at 409 ("The complaint does not allege that Verizon
voluntarily engaged in a course of dealing with its rivals, or would ever have
done so absent statutory compulsion.").
'0
Id. at 410 (observing that unlike Aspen's lift tickets, Verizon's "services
allegedly withheld are not otherwise marketed or available to the public").
"
ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM'N, sipra note 1, at 101.
12

KEITH N. HYLTON, ANTITRUST LAW: ECONOMic THEORY AND COMMON

LAW EVOLUTION 186-95 (2003).
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ancing approach introduced into the law by Judge Learned Hand in
Alcoa. '3 The other is the specific intent approach that existed in the
monopolization case law before Alcoa. 4 In order to better understand
the decision in Trinko, I think it is necessary to understand what these
standards require in the refusal to deal setting, and how Trinko fits
into these general approaches.
The balancing approach of Alcoa is easy to articulate. A dominant
firm violates section 2 of the Sherman Act if the procompetitive or
efficiency defenses for its conduct are insufficient to outweigh the
anticompetitive effects. Judge Hand did not describe the standard in
precisely these terms in Alcoa. Hand's language was summarized in
United States v. Grinnell as excusing the defendant from liability when
the maintenance or acquisition of its monopoly position could be
attributed to superior skill, foresight, and industry. 5 Excessively
aggressive efforts to obtain or maintain the monopoly, efforts that
could not be explained solely by efficiency, would be treated as conduct violating the standard. In Alcoa, the court found that the defendant violated the statute because its aggressive expansion and its
preemptive enhancement of capacity made it difficult for rivals to
enter the market and compete against it. In Judge Hand's view, the
aggressive expansion efforts of Alcoa could not be attributed entirely
to superior foresight or industrial necessity; they reflected a determination to foreclose markets to rivals.
The language of Alcoa has undergone some evolution over the
years. By the time of the United Shoe'" decision, the courts had begun
to focus on exclusionary conduct rather than aggressive acquisition.
As a signal to potential defendants of what sort of conduct might violate the law, the shift toward the term exclusion, rather than aggres13

14

United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
HYLTON, supra note 12, at 186-88.

is United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966) (holding
that a company's "growth or development as a consequence of a superior
product, business acumen, or historic accident" is distinct from an illegal
monopoly).
16
United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass.
1953).
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sive acquisition, was probably desirable. The term exclusion provides
notice to potential defendants that they may violate the law by taking
action that is designed to remove rivals from their markets. In contrast, the term "aggressive acquisition" has broader implications and
could easily chill any efforts to expand a business.
The Microsoft decision' 7 reveals another change in the language
used by courts to describe the monopolization test. The balancing of
anticompetitive effects against procompetitive benefits was implied
by the test Judge Hand articulated in Alcoa. The test for monopolization was described explicitly as a balancing test in Microsoft:
First, to be condemned as exclusionary, a monopolist's act must have an
"anticompetitive effect.". . . Second, the plaintiff.. .must demonstrate that
the monopolist's conduct indeed has the requisite anticompetitive effect....
Third, if a plaintiff successfully establishes a prima facie case.., then the
monopolist must proffer a "procompetitive justification" for its conduct....
Fourth, if the monopolist's procompetitive justification stands unrebutted, then the plaintiff must demonstrate that the anticompetitive harm
of the conduct outweighs the procompetitive benefit.'8
It should be clear that under the welfare balancing test, a dominant firm defendant could have a substantial efficiency justification
for its conduct, and yet still be found in violation of the law. Of
course, the precise method by which a court would balance anticompetitive effects against procompetitive benefits has never been
explained. In theory, one could estimate the loss in consumer welfare
from the defendant's conduct and compare that amount to the gain in
efficiency, as suggested by Oliver Williamson."9 However, courts have
not demanded litigants to frame their cases with such precision.
The specific intent approach was the predominant monopolization standard before the Alcoa decision, and is primarily responsible
for the perception that section 2 was ineffective until the Alcoa decision."' Under the specific intent standard, a dominant firm could be
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
is Id. at 58.
'7

'9
Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare
Tradeoffs, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 18 (1968).
2 See, e.g., HYLTON, supra note 12, at 188.
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held liable under section 2 only if the evidence supported the inferences that its conduct had no significant procompetitive or efficiency
justification and that the sole or primary purpose of the conduct was
to exclude a rival. Under the specific intent approach, a substantial
efficiency justification would immunize the defendant from liability
under section 2.
There are modern versions of the specific intent approach that
have been proposed by scholars. One is the profit sacrifice test, which
seeks to determine whether the defendant's conduct would have been
profitable if it did not have an exclusionary effect.2' If not, then the
defendant should be found liable. Another version of the specific
intent approach is the no-economic-sense test, under which the defendant is liable under section 2 if its conduct would not make economic
sense unless it had an exclusionary effect.22 Yet another version is the
equally efficient competitor test, which holds the defendant liable
only if its conduct would have excluded from its market an equally
efficient competitor.'
Each version of the specific intent approach attempts to immunize
the defendant for efficiency or procompetitive features of its conduct.
The specific intent approaches would not allow a defendant to be
held liable when the exclusionary effect of its conduct is primarily
attributable to its efficiency characteristics.24 Each of these tests avoids
balancing efficiency justifications against anticompetitive effects.
B. Trinko Viewed as a Specific Intent Standard
With these two general standards in mind, specific intent and welfare balancing, we can return to the Trinko decision to determine
21
A. Douglas Melamed, Exclusionary Conduct Under the Antitrust Lavs:
Balancing, Sacrifice, and Refuisals to Deal, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1247 (2005).
Gregory J. Werden, Identifying Exclusionary Conduct Under Section 2:
The "No Economic Sense" Test, 73 ANTITRUST L. J.413 (2006).
23

RICHARD

A.

POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 194-95

(2d ed. 2001).
24
Ronald A. Cass & Keith N. Hylton, Antitrust Intent, 74 S. CAL. L. REV.
657 (2001).
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which approach the Court adopted. Recall that the second distinction
the Court drew between Trinko and Aspen Skiing was based on the
pricing behavior: "In Aspen Skiing, the defendant turned down a proposal to sell at its own retail price, suggesting .. .that its future
monopoly retail price would be higher. Verizon's reluctance to interconnect at the cost-based rate of compensation.., tells us nothing
about dreams of monopoly.'"
These statements have implications for the issue of antitrust
intent. The refusal to sell at retail price immediately raises a question
of intent. Ordinarily, a firm makes at least a normal profit (i.e.,
recoups its costs, including opportunity costs) by selling at retail
price, and would not turn down a retail customer unless the cost of
the transaction is unusually high. Of the possible motivations behind
a refusal to sell to a rival at retail price, the intention to injure the
turned-down rival is a plausible one. The Trinko case is different
because the reluctance to engage with a rival in a transaction that has
a negative expected profit does not immediately raise the inference of
an exclusionary motivation. It obviously reflects an unwillingness to
suffer a cost in order to aid a rival. But it does not obviously suggest
an intention to injure the rival. In other words, exclusionary intent is a
highly plausible explanation for the conduct observed in Aspen
Skiing.26 In Trinko, the exclusionary motivation is greatly overshadowed by the more plausible self-interested cost minimization motive.
If the second distinction of Trinko is at the core of the Court's reasoning, then it suggests that the Court has adopted the specific intent
test for refusal to deal (or dominant firm essential facility) cases.
Trinko holds that a dominant firm cannot be found liable under section 2 when its refusal to cooperate with a rival reflects merely a
refusal to suffer a cost in order to aid or support the rival. The corolVerizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 409 (2004).
Of course, this does not mean that exclusion is the only plausible
26
explanation for the refusal to deal. An alternative explanation for the refusal
in Aspen Skiing is a desire on the part of Aspen not to allow its local rival
Highlands to free ride on its investments. See George L. Priest & Jonathan
Lewinsohn, Aspen Skiing: Product Differentiation and Thwarting Free Riding as
Monopolization, in ANTITRUST SToRIEs 229, 238-42 (Eleanor M. Fox & Daniel A.
Crane eds., 2007).
25
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lary of this proposition is that in order to find a violation of section 2
when a dominant firm refuses to cooperate with a rival, one has to
proffer evidence that indicates an intention to injure the rival. In other
words, the facts have to suggest that of the available motivations, the
intention to injure or exclude the rival is a highly plausible one.
Trinko rejects the balancing test of Alcoa. Under the balancing test,
the court would compare the justifications offered by the defendant
with the anticompetitive effects of its actions. In Trinko, the defendant
did not have a substantial procompetitive justification. Almost any
attempt to balance the (nonexistent) procompetitive justification
against the anticompetitive effect would have resulted in a decision
against the defendant.
If we look at Trinko in terms of the big picture of section 2 case law,
it implies that the monopolization standard has splintered. Courts still
refer to the general balancing test of Alcoa as the starting point for
monopolization cases. But in the area of refusals to deal, Trinko suggests
that the standard has changed and is effectively the specific intent test.
The tests I have described, welfare balancing and specific intent,
are simply signals to courts on the proper allocation of evidentiary
burdens. A court could easily apply the balancing test in a manner
that is consistent with the specific intent approach by raising the burden of proof on the plaintiff. However, rather than remain with the
same balancing test while altering the standard of proof for certain
cases, antitrust courts have adopted different standards that have the
same function. The specific intent test shifts the burden of proof
against the plaintiff while the balancing test puts roughly similar burdens on both parties. The purpose of shifting the burden is to minimize the costs of erroneous decisions.
The question I would like to consider is the normative one of what
standard should be applied to refusals to deal. If the standards are
really signals to courts on the proper allocation of proof burdens, then
the underlying reasons for those standards should be based on the
relative costs of erroneous decisions in favor the plaintiff and in favor
of the defendant. Any effort to determine relative error costs requires
an examination of the economic justifications for the defendant's conduct and for prohibiting it.
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III. ECONOMICS OF REFUSALS TO DEAL
AND ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES
In this part I will examine the economics of refusal to deal cases.
The term essential facility is not used in the Commission report, but I
will use it in this part in order to frame the cases. Most of the wellknown antitrust refusal to deal cases can be described as essential
facility cases.
The profit generated by a refusal to deal can be attributed to two
sources. One is efficiency. A refusal to deal may protect or enhance the
efficiency of an essential facility controlled by the defendant, or the
refusal may prevent some inefficient outcome in general. The other
source is the creation of competition barriers. A refusal to deal may
generate profits to the dominant firm by shielding it from competition
from a rival. Let n represent the dominant firm's profits. Let v represent the benchmark competitive price for the dominant firm's output,
which is equal to the marginal benefit to the consumer at the competitive level of output. Finally, let p represent the price and c represent
the unit cost of the dominant firm's output. The sources of profit can
be described by the following decomposition:27
An = (p

- Av) + (Av - Ac)

(1)

In simpler terms, this expression says that the short run change in
the dominant firm's profits from a refusal to deal can be traced to: (1)
the enhancement of competition barriers, which increases the difference between the dominant firm's price and the competitive benchmark price; and (2) the enhancement of efficiency, which increases the
difference between the competitive benchmark price (or product
value) and the unit cost.
Using this profit decomposition approach, we can separate the
refusal to deal cases into three categories. One category involves cases
in which the refusal to deal is part of an effort to protect or enhance
the efficiency of the essential facility. In terms of the decomposition
approach, cases in this category involve refusals to deal that either
27

See Keith N. Hylton, The Law and Economics of Monopolization Standards

(Boston Univ. Sch. of Law Working Paper No. 08-18, 2008), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1131250.
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improve the value or reduce the cost of the product, or prevent a
reduction in value or increase in cost (i.e., Av - Ac > 0). A second category of cases involves refusals that are designed to create or enhance
barriers to competition. These refusals either lead to a reduction in
the value of the product (the competitive benchmark price) to the
consumer or an increase in the price charged to the consumer (i.e.,
Ap - Av > 0). A third category of cases involves a combination of competition barrier creating and efficiency protecting conduct. Causation
is an important legal issue in the tradeoff cases in this third category.
A. Efficient refusals to deal
In cases where the underlying essential facility is efficient, refusals
to deal can be understood as efforts to protect or to enhance the efficiency of the facility. The best example is Associated Press v. United
States,' which involved a challenge to the membership rules governing the Associated Press (AP) news-sharing network. The network
was efficient because it permitted a newspaper member of the network to simultaneously enhance the quality of a newspaper issue
(Av > 0) and reduce the cost of producing it (Ac < 0). Newspapers
without access to the network were unable to offer the same quality of
news at the same price. Of course, their presence still forced AP to
share the efficiency gains with consumers. The United States brought
suit to enjoin an AP bylaw that permitted an AP member to veto the
membership application of a local rival.
In view of the function of the news-sharing network, the refusal to
permit a new member could have been efficiency protecting. First,
given that it is costly to create such a network, the rents earned
through its creation may have been necessary to recoup development
costs. Cost-reducing innovation gives the innovating firm a period in
which it earns rents from the innovation, until competing firms are
able to mimic it. The same process presumably was at work in the
case of the AP network.
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945). Associated Press
involves concerted activity rather than unilateral conduct. Still, the case is
useful in this discussion because I am focusing on the essential facility at the
core of the dispute. The economic issues I consider here are the same whether
the conduct is unilateral or concerted.
28
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The second way in which the refusal to deal may have been efficiency protecting has to do with the incentives to contribute to the
network. As a news-sharing network expands, it becomes easier for
any member to free ride off the efforts of other members. The creators
of such a network have an incentive to limit membership in order to
prevent the dissipation of the network's efficiencies.
It follows that the potential costs of enjoining the AP membership
bylaw are the loss of incentives to innovate and the reduction in the
network's efficiency. The first leads to a loss in consumer welfare in
the long run, the second to a loss in consumer welfare in the short
run. These should be treated as false conviction costs.
Since the network was efficient, one might wonder what gain
might come of requiring the network to open up to new members.
Requiring new membership could lead to competition on a lower cost
platform. The benefits of such competition would go directly to consumers. On the other hand, there is no guarantee that opening up
membership would have led to more vigorous competition on a
lower cost platform. The result could have been collusive entry, where
the new firms that join the network fix prices with their local incumbent network members. Indeed, given that local newspaper markets
are not large enough to support numerous competitors, the likelihood
of collusive entry would have been high. It is not clear that the welfare gains from opening entry to new members would add substantially to the gains generated by the creation of the network itself.
If we take Associated Press as a representative example of an efficient essential facility, the costs of opening access to the facility
appear to be as great as and probably greater than the potential gains.
Put another way, the false conviction costs of refusal to deal lawsuits,
in connection with efficient essential facilities, are likely to be high
relative to the false acquittal costs.
These arguments apply to Aspen Skiing, which is another case of
an efficient essential facility. The joint marketing arrangement
between Aspen and its smaller rival Highlands had the effect of
enhancing the value of the service to consumers. In terms of the profit
decomposition approach in equation (1), the joint-marketing arrangement led to Av - Ac > 0, because the option of skiing all the mountains
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owned by the two firms offered a superior skiing experience for longstay customers (destination-area skiers).
The effects of the refusal to deal in Aspen Skiing are more complicated. The essential facility was the joint-marketing arrangement. It
did not exist once Aspen refused to continue it with Highlands. One
could think of a potential essential facility, which is the combined
skiing experience over all the mountains owned by the two firms.
That potential facility could exist only when the two firms agreed to
a joint venture, or when one of the firms took control over all the
mountains.
The refusal to deal could have been exclusionary if the sole purpose for it was to permit Aspen to raise prices to consumers in the
short-stay ski market (the market consisting of local consumers who
would visit the mountains for a day or two). If the refusal made Highlands unprofitable as a stand-alone business, Aspen could gain a
monopoly in the short-stay market.
On the other hand, the refusal to deal in Aspen Skiing could have
been efficiency protecting if it supported the incentives of both parties
to make optimal investments to enhance and maintain their private
facilities. In the same sense, any refusal to share property with a trespasser can be treated as efficiency protecting because it supports
incentives to invest in the property. A rule requiring property owners
to share land with trespassers would diminish incentives to invest in
real property.
Aspen was the larger firm and owned three of the four mountains
in the area. Its investments were responsible for the majority of longstay visitors to the mountains. For a joint venture between the two
firms to be mutually beneficial, it would have to be on terms that permitted Aspen to recoup the costs and to exploit the productivity of its
investments.
The key reason for the termination of the joint venture in Aspen
Skiing was Aspen's refusal to accept a revenue sharing agreement
based on an audit of customer usage of the mountains. But a revenue
sharing agreement based on usage would fail to reward Aspen for the
productivity of its investments, and would permit Highlands to earn
a windfall.
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Aspen Skiing is similar to Associated Press when one examines
the false conviction and false acquittal costs. False conviction costs in
Aspen Skiing can be identified as the diminished investment incentives that a sharing requirement would have on Aspen and, conversely, the encouragement of parasitic dealmaking by Highlands. If
Highlands enjoyed a windfall from the joint venture, it would have
no incentive to reduce the amount it demanded from the revenue
sharing agreement as long as Aspen could not legally exit the joint
marketing relationship.
The false acquittal costs in Aspen Skiing are the welfare losses to
long-stay consumers denied access to the joint marketing product and
to short-stay consumers who would no longer benefit from competition between Aspen and Highlands in the short-stay market. But the
first cost is only a short term cost, because in the long term the joint
marketing product could be kept on the market only under a mutually beneficial contract between the two firms. The second cost is not
entirely a cost to society because it reflects the loss in Highlands'
appeal when no longer subsidized by Aspen. To the extent rents were
transferred from Aspen to Highlands to support a local duopoly in
the short-stay market, the termination of those transfers is equivalent
to the termination of a subsidy to the weaker firm. If consumers
enjoyed a greater benefit from the duopoly before rather than after
the termination, part of that benefit would have to be recognized as a
transfer from Aspen.
Refusals to deal as competition barriers

B.

There are cases in which the profit resulting to the defendants
from the refusal to deal is due to the creation of entry barriers. In
American Tobacco Growers v. Neal, 29 the defendants were given the
power to regulate tobacco warehouse sales and used it to block the
plaintiff's access to the sales. The underlying essential facility, access
to sales, provided no reduction in costs or increase in value. The
defendants did not alter the value of the output to the consumer or
Am. Fed'n of Tobacco Growers v. Neal, 183 F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1950).
Although this is another case involving concerted rather than unilateral conduct, it is useful for this discussion because I am focusing on the nature of the
essential facility.
2
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reduce the cost of supply. They controlled an essential market portal, a
point of entry that was necessary for rivals to enter to be able to compete with them.
The profits from the refusal to deal in American Tobacco Growers
were due to the exclusionary effect of the refusal. In terms of the
profit-decomposition approach in equation (1), the change in profits
from the defendants' refusal to deal were the result of the higher
prices that the defendants could charge when shielded from competition with the plaintiff. The refusal did not, at least in the short run,
alter the quality of the output (Av = 0), though the long term effect of
shielding the defendants from competition probably would have been
a weakening of their incentives to improve the quality of their tobacco
(Av < 0). The refusal did not serve to protect the efficiency of the warehouse sales. There was no evidence that the addition of another firm
would adversely affect the operation of the auctions (Ac = 0).
The fact that the addition of the plaintiff would reduce the rents
earned by the incumbent firms should not be considered a welfare
loss. The rents were not necessary to induce the firms to create a costreducing or value-increasing facility. Indeed, allowing the defendants
to hold onto the rents earned through exclusion would have the
undesirable long term effect of encouraging firms to gain control over
market portals as a monopolizing tactic.
Looking at American Tobacco Growers from the error cost perspective, the case can be distinguished from Associated Press in terms of the
balance of false conviction and false acquittal costs. If we regard
access to the market portal to be the essential facility in American
Tobacco Growers, the false convictions costs are relatively small
because of the absence of efficiency justifications. In contrast, the efficiency justifications for the essential facility in Associated Press, the
news-sharing network, were substantial and obvious. This implies
that the false conviction costs suggested by Associated Press are substantially greater than those suggested by American Tobacco Growers.
The false acquittal costs in American Tobacco Growers also appear to
be different from those in Associated Press. In Associated Press, the false
acquittal costs are the welfare gains that might have been realized as a
result of enhanced competition within the news-sharing network. But
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this prospect for enhanced competition was unclear, given the risks of
shirking, free riding, and collusive entry. In contrast, the false acquittal costs in American Tobacco Growers consist of two components: the
consumer welfare from enhanced competition within the warehouse
system that would be lost as a result of an acquittal, and the incentive
to similarly-positioned actors to acquire market portals for exclusionary purposes. As in the case of Associated Press, it is hard to say a priori whether the entry of one firm would have produced a net gain to
consumers given the risk of collusive entry. However, as additional
firms joined the warehouse, more competition would eventually
result. In comparison, such a conclusion would not be clear in Associated Press given the natural monopoly (or oligopoly) characteristics of
local newspaper markets. This implies that the first component of the
false acquittal cost, the potential gain to consumers, is smaller in Associated Press than in American Tobacco Growers. In addition, the second
component of the false acquittal cost, the encouragement of rent-seeking, is obviously an important concern in American Tobacco Growers.
IV. LEGAL STANDARD
Now I will consider the implications of this argument for the
appropriate legal test for refusals to deal. In general, the specific
intent approach is preferable when the ratio of false conviction to
false acquittal costs is relatively high. Thus, in the case of an efficient
essential facility, the specific intent test is appropriate. The reason is
that the specific intent test reduces the risk of false convictions relative to the welfare balancing test. And since false convictions are
likely to be more costly than false acquittals in a case like Associated
Press, the specific intent approach is preferable.
It follows that the approach of Trinko should be applied to cases in
the efficient category, such as Associated Press and Aspen Skiing. This
implies that any impairment in efficiency (e.g., an increase in operating costs) to members in the Associated Press network should serve as
an excuse for a refusal to deal. A violation of the monopolization standard should be inferred only when the evidence indicates that the primary or sole purpose for the refusal to deal was to exclude the rival.
A refusal to suffer a cost in order to aid a rival should not be considered a violation of the legal standard.
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In the case of a market portal essential facility, the foregoing
analysis implies eiher a different approach to the standard or a different standard. Since the ratio of false conviction to false acquittal costs
is not obviously high, the welfare balancing standard may be preferable to the specific intent standard.
To reduce this to a concrete case, return to American Tobacco Growers. Under the specific intent standard of Trinko, any significant
increase in operating costs could be used by the defendants as a justification for their refusal to deal. Such a rule might lead to an undesirable outcome in a case like American Tobacco Growers.
The defendants in American Tobacco Growers could have pointed
to, and in fact did point to, several costs that they would bear as a
result of letting the plaintiff into the warehouse sales. The defendants
noted that the plaintiff, because he was located outside of city
bounds, was subject to lower taxes, fewer restrictions, and lower
property costs?0 From the defendants' perspective, it was reasonable
to exclude the plaintiff because he would have operated with lower
costs, and his business would have expanded relative to theirs
because of access to the warehouse system. In addition, the defendants could have pointed to the need to schedule time for the plaintiff
in the warehouses, which would have been a cost associated with
admitting the plaintiff. The defendants had conceded that there was
ample time to schedule the plaintiff without impairing their allotments of time.31 However, the mere cost of coordinating and scheduling could have been asserted by the defendants as a cost of dealing
with the plaintiff.
If we examine the defendants' arguments (both real and possible)
in American Tobacco Growers under the specific intent approach of
Trinko, it is not immediately clear that they would have been rejected.
The defendants' arguments should have been rejected because they
fail to identify a substantial cost or impairment in efficiency for the
defendants. But the difficulty is that a court might find that the defendants' arguments do in fact identify a substantial cost or impairment
under the analysis of Trinko. For example, a court might find that the

31

Id. at 871.
Id.
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mere cost of coordinating and scheduling the plaintiff should be taken
as a sufficient justification for the decision to exclude the plaintiff
from access.
As this argument suggests, the risk of error has to be taken into
account at the level of application of the standard. The specific intent
standard appears best when the ratio of false conviction costs to false
acquittal costs is high. However, the specific intent test is not error
free. Errors can and will occur under any legal standard. The best test
is one that leads to the least costly errors in expectation.
The specific intent test of Trinko could generate the right conclusion in American Tobacco Growers and would if it were applied in an
error-free manner. But in view of the risk that the standard could
result in acquittal in instances in which the exclusion is almost surely
anticompetitive, the specific intent test may be less desirable than the
welfare balancing test.
Consider the welfare balancing test in the case of American Tobacco
Growers. Under this approach, the defendants could offer the same
justifications examined above. Consider, for example, the justification
that the defendants excluded the plaintiff because they did not want
to suffer the cost of coordinating and scheduling the plaintiff's warehouse time, even though there was time that could be allocated to the
plaintiff without diminishing the time allotments to the defendants.
Under the welfare balancing test, this defense would have to be
weighed against the consumer welfare gains of enhanced competition
within the warehouse system. In one particular instance, the welfare
gains from entry may seem small. As a general proposition, however,
the welfare gains from entry are substantial. The welfare balancing
test would suggest that, in general, the consumer welfare gains from
entry outweigh the scheduling and coordination costs of the defendants-unless the defendants could produce evidence demonstrating
that the coordination and scheduling costs were large.
The implications of these cases can be generalized. In efficient
essential facility cases, refusals to deal should be examined under the
specific intent standard implied by Trinko. The efficient essential facility cases include examples such as Associated Press, where the facility
is the product of joint investments by a group of firms. This category
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also includes cases in which the defendant has developed an infrastructure, such as an electricity transmission grid, that reduces the
cost of supplying consumers. The other broad category of essential
facility cases involves market portals. In market portal cases, such as
American Tobacco Growers and (perhaps) Terminal Railroad3 2 refusals to
deal should be examined under the welfare balancing test, as articulated in Microsoft.
I have so far assumed that it is easy to distinguish efficient essential facility cases from market portal cases. The fact that it may not be
easy suggests that a general preference for the specific intent standard, in the context of refusals to deal, would be preferable. In freeentry markets for acquisition or development of an essential facility,
the presumption should be that any such facility is efficient. In government regulation settings, such as that observed in American Tobacco
Growers, the presumption of efficiency would not be appropriate.
Suppose the conduct of the defendant involves several acts, some
of which are exclusionary and others efficiency enhancing. Should the
combination of defendants' actions be considered under the specific
intent standard or under the welfare balancing test?
For the mixed cases, courts should apply the appropriate standard
to each act. The more important issue is the causation standard. The
Microsoft decision suggested that the causation test should not stand
as a serious barrier to plaintiffs in monopolization cases.3 If error
costs are taken seriously, however, causation should be carefully analyzed in monopolization cases. If the underlying essential facility is
efficient-such as the Windows operating system-acts designed to
exclude access to that system should be analyzed under the specific
intent standard as a default rule. The welfare balancing test should be
applied only if the purely exclusionary acts-that is, the acts that
could not be attributed to the protection of the facility's efficiencycould be considered sufficiently effective to explain or account for the
plaintiff's injury.
United States v. Terminal R. R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 383 (1912)
(defendant railroads gained control of terminal facilities for railroads crossing
Mississippi River into St. Louis).
33 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 79 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
32
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CONCLUSION

The Commission's conclusion that refusals to deal should rarely if
ever be unlawful is a useful guiding principle for courts and the right
approach as a default rule. However, when error costs are examined,
a more detailed set of principles emerges. The legal standard governing refusals to deal should depend upon the efficiency properties of
the essential facility at the core of the dispute.

